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Abstract
In this paper we study the effects of a change in an exogenous variable (the fixed cost or a
parameter in the demand function) on the output and the number of active firms in a Symmetric
Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry (SCEFE). The results obtained here are different from those
obtained in the Cournot model with a given number of firms. In particular, an increase in demand
might yield a decrease in the output of the industry. We also show that any observation on prices,
profits and number of firms is compatible with the assumption that the market is in a SCEFE. If
fixed costs can be observed, there is a loose relationship between the profit rate and the number of
active firms. This result is used as a warning against the use of the profit rate as a measure of an
anticompetitive position and against the Structure–Conduct–Performance paradigm.
Keywords: Entry; Comparative statics; Rate of profits; Anti-trust policy
JEL classification: L13
1 . Introduction
A large number of papers have analyzed comparative static under imperfect
competition. In the case of the Cournot model with a given number of firms the list
includes McManus (1962, 1964), Frank (1965), Ruffin (1971), Okuguchi (1973), Seade
(1980), Szidarovsky and Yakowitz (1982), Dixit (1986), Quirmbach (1988) and
Corchon (1994). All these papers assume a strong concavity condition which implies
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that the best reply of any firm is a decreasing function of the output of other firms. The
latter property has been called by Bulow et al. (1985) strategic substitution. Comparative
statics in the case of strategic complementarities (best replies are increasing, like in price
competition with, say, linear demand) was worked out by Lippman et al. (1987), Vives
(1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Milgrom and Shannon (1992).
The existence of a Cournot equilibrium with free entry was first considered by
Novshek (1980). However, to the best of our knowledge, no attention has been paid to
the properties of this kind of equilibrium. Our paper attempts to remedy this situation.
In Section 2 we present the model. We assume that all firms are identical, strong
concavity holds for positive output and fixed costs are positive. The only decision for
firms is the quantity of output (zero output corresponds to no entry). The strategic
behavior of a firm is described by a mapping which is continuous except at the
entry–exit point. From this it follows easily that a Symmetric Cournot Equilibrium with
Free Entry (SCEFE in the sequel) exists.
In Section 3 we study comparative statics. We show that a change in the fixed cost has
the effect that intuition suggests: the number of active firms and aggregate output move
in opposite direction of the fixed cost while individual output moves in the same
direction. However, the effect of a change in demand or marginal costs is, in general,
ambiguous. We obtain definitive predictions only when an additional and very restrictive
assumption holds (namely Assumption 6, see the main text). We also provide an example
in which an increase in demand decreases the number of active firms and aggregate
output. Thus, our main conclusion in this part of the paper is that there is an important
difference between the Cournot model with and without entry. In the latter, under strong
concavity, aggregate output changes monotonically with marginal costs or with the
parameters of the demand function (see, e.g., Corchon, 1994), Proposition 6). In the case
of free entry, strong concavity is not enough to yield definitive predictions on aggregate
output.
In Section 4 we study the observational implications of our model both at individual
and market level. Firstly, we assume that the behavior of the representative firm can be
perfectly observed (i.e., it can be replicated in a laboratory). This behavior relates the
aggregate output of the competitors of the representative firm (denoted by Q) and the
output of the representative firm (denoted by q). We derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for a set of data on q and Q to be rationalized as the behavior of a profit
maximizing firm. These conditions are: (1) for strictly positive values of q, q must be
strictly decreasing on Q with slope larger than minus one; (2) there is an unique value of
Q (say y) for which q is either zero or positive; (3) for Q larger than y, q is always zero.
Secondly we consider market behavior. Suppose that an observation of market price,
profits and number of firms can be obtained from an experiment or from a real market
(notice that in this case, profits are observable). The question is: What triples hprice,
profits, number of active firmsj can be generated as SCEFE? In order to tie our hands as
tight as possible we assume strong restrictions on the form of both demand (assumed to
be of unit elasticity) and marginal cost (assumed to be constant). However, despite such
strong restrictions, any triple hprice, profits, number of active firmsj can be generated as
SCEFE. If fixed costs are also observable, there is a loose relationship between the
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˜number of active firms and the (extraordinary) profit rate. In particular if p are observed
˜
˜profits, k the observed fixed cost and n is the observed number of active firms, it must
be that
p˜ 1 2
] ] ], 1 .2
˜ n˜n˜k
This implies that with 20 active firms (a number of firms that many economist would
consider large), the upper bound on the profit rate is, approximately, 10%, larger than
2
most actual profit rates reported in Fortune. Thus the main conclusion of this part of the
paper is that the Cournot model with free entry does not support the view that there is a
˜
˜ ˜direct relationship between profitability (p /k ) and concentration (1 /n ). This has
important consequences on, at least, three counts:
(a) Antitrust policy. A high profit rate does not necessarily imply lack of competition
and/or collusion among existing firms. This has been pointed out by several authors
(see, e.g., Cabral, 2000, p. 157; and Martin, 1993, pp. 499–507). They have noticed that
profitability might be a poor proxy for the price /marginal cost ratio, which is the right
measure of an anticompetitive position. Our results make this point sharply by showing
that even if information about market conditions is available, the only implication of
(Cournot) competition and free entry is that there is an upper bound on the rate of profit
and that this bound may be very large.
(b) Structure–Conduct–Performance paradigm. According to Bain ‘‘We would
anticipate some complex relationship of, at least, three variables, profit rate, degree of
seller concentration and conditions of entry’’ (Bain, 1956, p. 191). If entry conditions
are summarized by fixed costs, this relationship is precisely the inequality above. Our
theoretical result could provide a possible explanation of why the relationship postulated
by Bain is ‘‘weak . . . often . . . not statistically significant’’ (Carlton and Perloff, 1990, p.
375).
(c) Entry and rates of profit. There are persistent differences in the rate of profits
across industries. Moreover, high profit rates often decline slowly in highly concentrated
industries (see, e.g., Carlton and Perloff, 1990, pp. 372, 381). Again, our result, provides
a possible explanation of this fact, because it shows that free entry is compatible with
different profit rates, even if the functional form of demand and cost functions is the
same in all markets.
2 . The model
In this section we present our main definitions and some basic results. There are
countably many identical potential firms. Let n be the number of active firms, q be the
1Recall that these are extraordinary profits, i e , profits net of opportunity costs
2Profit rates reported in the magazine Fortune usually vary between 4 and 7% Subtracting the interest rate we
obtain the rate of extraordinary profits Thus if the interest rate is assumed to be 4% the rates reported there
correspond to rates of extraordinary profits between 0 and 3%
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output of a representative firm and Q be the aggregate output of the competitors of the
representative firm. Let k be the fixed cost and K the space of all possible fixed costs.
Let b be a parameter in the demand or the variable cost functions (i.e., subsidies,
income, other prices, etc.) and B the set of all possible b’s. Let B and K be subsets of
2
R . The payoff function of the representative firm, denoted by p :R 3B3K →R is1 1
such that:
p(q,Q,b,k)5V(q,Q,b)2 k if q. 0
p(q,Q,b,k)5 0 if q5 0
where V is a twice differentiable function into R . Partial derivatives of V will be1
denoted by a subscript, i.e., V ,V ,V , etc. It is implicit that we are assuming productq Q b
homogeneity since only the sum of outputs of competitors (Q) is payoff relevant.
However, product heterogeneity of a certain kind can be considered as well (see, e.g.,
Yarrow 1985, p. 517).
The best reply correspondence, denoted by R( ), is defined as follows:
R(Q,b,k)5 arg max p(q,Q,b,k).
q
And the best reply correspondence under zero fixed costs is,
r(Q,b)5 arg max V(q,Q,b).
q
The following assumptions will be maintained throughout the paper:
A.1. 0[⁄ K. ;(b,k)[B3K, max V(q,0,b). k.q
¯ ¯A.2. There is q such that ;Q, V(q,Q,b)# 0 if q$ q.
¯ ¯A.3. There is Q such that ;q, V(q,Q,b)# 0 if Q $Q.
2A.4 V , 0 on the interior of R 3B.Q 1
2A.5 V ,V , 0 on the interior of R 3B.qq qQ 1
These assumptions describe several properties of the payoff function. A.1 postulates a
positive fixed cost, which can be covered in case of a monopoly. Under A.2 no firm will
¯ ¯produce an output larger than q since p(q,Q,b,K), 0,;q$ q. A.3 implies that if the
¯output of the competitors exceed Q, the representative firm cannot make positive
payoffs. In the case in which payoffs are profits, A.4 is equivalent to say that the demand
function is strictly decreasing. Finally A.5 implies three things: (a) q and Q are strategic
substitutes (since dR /dQ5 2V /V , 0 whenever R is differentiable). (b) The bestqQ qq
reply function is a contraction (sinceudR /dQu, 1). (c) V is strictly concave on q. In the
case in which payoffs are profits, A.5 implies a standard assumption in the literature on
Cournot equilibrium (see e.g., Hahn, 1962; and Friedman, 1982, p. 496, Assumption 3),
namely
qp 1 p , 0 and p 2C , 0,qqQQ Q Q
where p is the inverse demand function and C is the cost function of the representative
firm. The strong concavity condition mentioned before corresponds to the above
assumption in the case of a general payoff function. We now present the main definition
of the paper.
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Definition 1. A Symmetric Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry (SCEFE) for (b,k) is a
* *pair (n , q ) [ N 3 R such that:1
* * *(i) q [R((n 2 1)q ,b, k).
* *(ii) 0[R(n q ,b, k).
There are three aspects of our definition that are worthwhile discussing: first, in a
SCEFE, entry and output setting are simultaneous. If entry and output setting are
sequential, the notion of equilibrium would be that of Symmetric Subgame Perfect
˜Cournot Equilibrium (SSPCE). Lopez-Cunat (1997) has shown that under assumptions
similar to ours, the set of SSPCE is contained in the set of SCEFE and thus results
similar to ours can be obtained in the sequential model. Second, we disregard mixed
strategies. This is not the place to discuss the relative merits of mixed and pure
strategies: we just notice that the interpretation of mixed strategies is, sometimes,
troublesome and that the bulk of industrial organization has ignored mixed strategies.
Thus, given that this is the first paper studying comparative statics of SCEFE, it appears
that concentrating on pure strategy equilibria is a conservative but sound research
strategy. See Cabral (1997) for an interesting paper on entry and mixed strategies.
Finally we concentrate on symmetric equilibria in the sense that the output of active
firms is identical (however, notice that in a SCEFE there are inactive firms). It is easy to
see that there are no asymmetric equilibria. Let x be aggregate output. For any two firms
with strictly positive output, say q and q we must have V (q ,x2 q ,b,k)5V (q ,x2i j q i i q j
q ,b,k). Because ≠V /≠q5V 2V , 0 this implies q 5 q .j q qq qQ i j
The existence of a SCEFE can be easily established.
Theorem 1. There is a SCEFE for all (b,k)[B 3K.
Proof. It follows from well-known arguments, see e.g., Proposition 4.8 in Corchon
(1996), appendix to Chapter 4. h
3 . Comparative statics
In this section we present our results on comparative statics. Let
E(b,k)5 h(n,q) /(n,q) is a SCEFE for (b,k)j.
E(b,k) can contain more than one element, even though, as we remarked before, the
Cournot equilibrium for given n is unique. Given this lack of uniqueness we have two
options. The first is to work with sets of equilibria. The second is to make a selection on
the set of SCEFE such that equilibrium becomes unique. The first option has the
advantage of being more comprehensive but it yields lengthy proofs. The second option
has the advantage of being simpler and to yield analogous results to the first option. In
this paper we follow the second route. Readers interested in the first option should
consult Corchon and Fradera (1996) where we prove similar results to those presented
here for the case where SCEFE may be a set.
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3Among all SCEFE we will select the equilibrium with the largest number of firms. In
4this equilibrium aggregate output is maximal among all SCEFE. The reason for
choosing this selection is discussed in the final section. Abusing notation, the SCEFE
with the largest number of firms will be denoted by SCEFE as before. Let e(b,k) be the
selection of E(b,k) such that the number of firms is the largest. We first study the effect
of changes in k.
Theorem 2. Let (n ,q )5 e(b,k ) and (n ,q )5 e(b,k ), with k , k . Then, n $ n ,1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2
q # q , n q $ n q .1 2 1 1 2 2
ˆProof. Let Q(k) be the value of which a firm is indifferent between producing a positive
output and not producing at all (see Theorem 4 below for a formal proof of the existence
ˆ ˆ ˆof Q(k)). It is clear that if k , k , Q(k ).Q(k ). Other than this, the best reply1 2 1 2
correspondence if the fixed cost were k and the best reply correspondence if the fixed1
cost were k are identical because fixed costs only matter in determining if the output is2
positive or zero.
The SCEFE with maximal number of firms when the fixed cost is k is characterized1
by the following:
q [R(q (n 2 1),b,k ).1 1 1 1
q[⁄ R(q(n 1 v),b,k ) ;q[R , ;v5 0,1, . . .1 1 1
Now, we have two cases. If q [R(q (n 2 1),b,k ), q[⁄ R(q(n 1 v),b,k ) ;q[1 1 1 2 1 2
R ,;v5 0,1, . . . . Thus, e(b,k )5 e(b,k ) and the result follows.1 1 2
If q [⁄ R(q (n 2 1),b,k ) then it must be that n , n . Since R is decreasing in Q,1 1 1 2 2 1
q , q . Since 0. dR /dQ . 2 1, n q . n q . h1 2 1 1 2 2
Theorem 2 says that a decrease in the value of the fixed cost, increases (weakly) the
equilibrium number of firms, decreases (weakly) the output of the representative firm
and increases (weakly) aggregate output. This agrees with our intuition and with the
results obtained in the Cournot model with a given number of firms (see the Refs. given
in Section 1).
Let us now turn our attention to the effects of a change in b. This change may have
ambiguous effects because it affects simultaneously the level of aggregate output at
which no additional firm is willing to enter and the behavior of active firms via marginal
profits. The following assumption establishes conditions on these effects that yield
unambiguous results.
3It is easy to show that under A 1–5 such a selection exists
4 i i i 1 0 i i iProof: Let (q ,Q ,n ) i5 0,1 be two SCEFE with n . n Since Q 5 (n 2 1)R(Q ),i5 0,1 we obtain that
1 1 0 0 1 0Q /R(Q ).Q /R(Q ) which, given that dR /dQ, 0, implies Q .Q On the other hand, dR /dQ . 2 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1implies that R(Q )2R(Q ) /Q 2Q . 2 1 Given that Q .Q , we obtain that R(Q ).R(Q )1Q 2Q
i i 1 0
which, given that q 5R(Q ),i5 0,1, implies that x . x
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V Vqb qQ 2] ](A.6) V . 0,V $ 0. Moreover # in the interior of R 3B.b qb 1V Vb Q
A.6 says two things: (1) b affects positively to both payoffs and marginal payoffs; (2)
the effect on marginal profits of a change in b relative to the effect of b on profits cannot
be larger than the effect on marginal profits of a change in Q relative to the effect of Q
on profits.
In order to understand A.6, let us assume that payoffs are profits, the inverse demand
2function is p5 e2 aq2 aQ and the variable cost function is cq1 dq /2. Thus, letting
a ; e2 c and b ; a1 d /2,
d 2]V5 (e2 aq2 aQ)q2 cq2 q 5 (a 2bq2 aQ)q.2
It is easy to see that A.6 holds in the case where the parameter b is a, but it does not
hold when b is b.
We now show that under A.6 an increase in b increases the SCEFE values of n and
n3 q.
Theorem 3. Let (n ,q )5 e(b ,k) and (n ,q )5 e(b ,k) with b . b . If A.6 holds,1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
(i) n 5 n implies n q $ n q .1 2 1 1 2 2
(ii) n ± n implies n . n , and n q . n q .1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
Proof. (i) In this case the result follows from the fact that our model is identical to the
Cournot model with a given number of firms (see, e.g., Corchon, 1994, Proposition 6).
(ii) Recall that r(Q,b) is the best reply correspondence under zero fixed costs. Let
˜ ˜
˜Q(b,k)5MaxhQ[R:V(r(Q,b),Q,b)5 kj, and q(b,k)5 r(Q(b,k),b). Notice, that if we fix
˜ ˆb, Q(b,k) equals Q(k) as defined in the proof of Theorem 2.
˜Q(b,k)
]]Thus, if (n,q)5 e(b,k), then n5Max n[N:n# 1 1 .H Jq˜(b,k)
V VV V qQ qbb b
˜
˜] ] ] ]Then, Q 5 2 . 0 and q 5 2 # 0 (by A.6). Hence, n . n .S Db b 1 2V V V VQ qq Q b
Now we show that n q . n q . We have 2 1, r , 0 and r $ 0. Assume (n 21 1 2 2 Q b 1
1)q # (n 2 1)q . Since n . n , it has to be that q , q . But1 2 2 1 2 1 2
q 5 r((n 2 1)q ,b )$ r((n 2 1)q ,b )$ r((n 2 1)q ,b )5 q1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
which is a contradiction. Hence, (n 2 1)q . (n 2 1)q . Now we have1 1 2 2
n q 5 (n 2 1)q 1 r((n 2 1)q ,b ). (n 2 1)q 1 r((n 2 1)q ,b )1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1
$ (n 2 1)q 1 r((n 2 1)q ,b )5 n q . h2 2 2 2 2 2 2
We now present a counterexample to Theorem 3 when A.6 does not hold.
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Example. Let V5 (a 2bq2 aQ)q, as in the example given after A.6. The best reply
function of the representative firm when k is zero is
(a 2 aQ)
]]]q5 .2b
Let a, b and a be functions of b. It is easy to compute that,
a 2 ]
˜ ] ]Q(b,k)5 2 bk.œa a
Let a9, b9 and a9 be the values of a, b and a after the change in b. This change is
chosen to be such that (see Fig. 1):
1. The slope of the best reply function remains constant, i.e., a /b 5 a9 /b9.
] ]
˜2. Q(b,k) remains constant, i.e., a /a2 2/a bk5a9 /a92 2/a9 b9k.œ œ
3. R(0,b,k) increases, i.e., a /b ,a9 /b9.
We will show that such a change is possible: given that, from 1 above, b95 a9b /a, 3
and 2 above are equivalent to
]]
a9a aa9 2a9 kba9]
] ]] ] ]],a95 2 bk1 2 .œ œa a a a
Fig 1
8
  
The interval in which a9 lies is non-empty if and only if a. a9. Thus, choose a. a9, a9
belonging to the above interval and b95 a9b /a (,b ).
In Fig. 1 we picture SCEFE before and after the change in b. The SCEFE with the
maximum number of firms is located in the intersection of the best reply correspondence
with the line representing the higher number of firms (e.g., n or n2 1, etc.). We see that
the best reply correspondence after the change in b lies upwards the best reply
correspondence before the change in b. However, the SCEFE after the change is such
that the number of firms decreases. What about aggregate output q1Q? First notice that
q1Q can be measured in Fig. 1: Given any point (q9,Q9) all points located on the 458
line passing through (q9,Q9) (the dotted lines in Fig. 1) are such that aggregate output is
identical. At any point located to the left of this line aggregate output is less than
q91Q9. We see in Fig. 1 that if R(0,b,k) and R(0,b9,k) are sufficiently close, the
intersection of R( ,b9,k) with the line n2 1 is such that aggregate output in the SCEFE
relative to b9 is smaller than the aggregate output in the SCEFE relative to b. h
The intuition behind this example is that if demand shifts out but is also made more
elastic, this intensifies competition in such a way that fewer firms find entry profitable
and, as a result of fewer firms, industry supply is reduced in spite of larger demand.
Finally, we check which part of A.6 does not hold. Notice that in the example above,
R( ) shifts upwards. Since dq /db5 2V /V . 0, it must be that V . 0. Also, sinceqb qq qb
˜Q 5 2V /V 5 0 it must be that V 5 0. However, the example could have beenb b Q b
˜constructed if Q increases just a little bit (see Fig. 1) and in this case, V . 0. However,b
the last part of A6 is violated because if V /V #V /V , easy calculations show thatqb b qQ Q
b9$b, contradicting that b9,b.
4 . Observable regularities
In this section we will be concerned with the following question. Suppose that some
variables (e.g., price, profits, output, etc.) are observable. Does the notion of a SCEFE
restrict in any way these observations? In other words, is any observation of these
variables compatible with the hypothesis of the model? We will first assume that we
have observations about q and Q. The question is: Is any set of observations on q and Q
compatible with the hypothesis that these observations are on the best reply corre-
spondence of the representative firm? In order to answer this question let us introduce
the following concept.
Definition 2. A correspondence f :R →R is said to be admissible if:1 1
o(i) ;Q[ [0,y), some y. 0, f is C with positive values and strictly decreasing.
(ii) When Q5 y, f has two values namely lim f(z) with z[ [0,y) and 0.→ yz(iii) For Q. y, f(Q)5 0.
1(iv) ≠f/≠Q. 2 1 whenever f [C .
The following result shows that, under A.1–5, admissible and best reply corre-
spondences, are equivalent concepts.
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Theorem 4. (a) Under A.1 –5, the best reply correspondence R is admissible. (b) Let f
1be an admissible correspondence. There exists a cost function C, which is C in R ,11
and a linear inverse demand function p5 A2 q2Q such that
if p(q,Q) ; (A2 q2Q)q2C(q), then f(Q) ; arg max (A2 q2Q)q2C(q).
q[R1
where p, as defined above, fulfills A.1 –5.
Proof. Part (a) follows easily (see our comments to A.12 5 above).
(i) R. 0 in [0,y) follows from the second part of A.1, and dR /dQ, 0. Notice that
˜y5Q(b,k).
(ii) follows from 0[⁄ K, and A.3–4.
(iii) follows from 0[⁄ K, and A.2–3–4.
(iv) follows from 0.V .V .qQ qq
¯Let us now prove part (b). let Q5 y1 a,a. 0. Let F be a continuous extension of f
o
¯ ¯to [0,Q ] with F strictly decreasing and F(Q )5 0. F is invertible. Since F [C ,
21 o 21 21F [C . Also, F is bounded, and, thus, F is integrable (see Bartle, 1976, pp. 156,
21427). Let t(q) be the primitive of F (q) for q[ [0, f(0)]. t can be extended to R such1
othat t[C for q. f(0). By choosing appropriately the integration constant t(0)5 0. Let
2C(q) ; Aq2 q 2 t(q)1 k if q. 0 and C(0)5 0 if q5 0,
where k is a positive number to be determined later on. Take A such that C(q). 0 and
dC /dq. 0,;q[ [0, f(0)]. Let p5 A2 q2Q. Define:
2p ; p(x)q2C(q)5 (A2 q2Q)q2 Aq1 q 1 t(q)2 k.
≠p 21]Thus, 5F (q)2Q5 0.
≠q
21Since F is strictly decreasing, second-order conditions of profit maximization are
21
satisfied and thus, F (q)5Q determines a profit maximizing output if k5 0. Since
21F is strictly decreasing beyond f(0), outputs greater than f(0) are never chosen.
21 21Therefore, F (q)5 f (q) and thus, q5 f(Q). Now let k5 t( f( y))2 yf( y) with y as
defined in Definition 2, part ii. Thus
p 5 t(q)2Qq2 k,if q. 0.
If Q5 y, the firm is indifferent between producing 0 and f( y). Notice that dp /dQ5
t9 f 92 f 9Q2 f 5 2 f , 0 and thus payoffs are positive for Q, y. By the same token,
payoffs would be negative if the firm produced a positive output for Q . y. Thus, f is
the best reply correspondence of a firm with payoff function p. We will show now that p
fulfills A.1–5.
A.1: Since at Q5 0, the firm chooses positive output and p is strictly concave on q, k
(as defined above) . 0 and max p(q,0). 0.q
A.2: It follows from the definition of p.
A.3: From the definition of t is clear that p , 0 for q large enough.
A.4: It follows from the previous arguments
A.5: It follows from the definition of p and F. h
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Next, we will concentrate on the following question. Suppose we have an observation
about prices, profits and number of active firms. Is there any relationship between these
variables, for instance between profits and the number of active firms, were they
generated by a SCEFE? The answer is no, even under strong functional restrictions on
the shape of demand and costs.
2
˜ ˜ ˜ ˜Theorem 5. Let (n,p,p )[N3R be an observation of a number of firms (n . 1), a1
price and profits. There is an isoelastic demand function with unit elasticity and a cost
function with constant marginal costs for which the SCEFE with maximal number of
˜ ˜ ˜firms is (n,p,p ).
Proof. Let x be aggregate output, i.e., x5 q1Q. Let p5A /x be the candidate inverse
demand function and let C 5 cq1 k (if q. 0) and C 5 0 (if q5 0) be the candidatei i
cost function. Given these two functions a necessary and sufficient condition for ( p,n,p)
to be a SCEFE with maximal number of firms is that
]
cn A AF G]] ] ]p5 , n5E , p 5 2 k, where E(w) ; integer part of w.2œn2 1 k n
We will now construct an inverse demand and a cost function, i.e., we will find values of
˜ ˜ ˜the parameters A, k and c such that the SCEFE of this economy is (n,p,p ). Let
2 2 2
˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜(n 1´) p n p n p(n2 1)
]]]] ]]] ]]]A5 , k5 , c5 ,2 2 n˜˜ ˜e 1 2e n e 1 2e n
where e is an arbitrary number in (0,1). The SCEFE for this economy is:
2
˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜p(n2 1) n (n 1´) p
˜ ˜ ˜ ˜]]] ]] ]]]p5 ? 5 p, p 5 2 k5p, n5E fn 1e g5 n.2
˜ ˜n (n2 1) ˜e 1 2e n
Thus, the proposition is proved. h
Suppose now that the fixed cost k is also observable. Does the previous result change?
The answer is, not much.
3
˜
˜ ˜ ˜ ˜Theorem 6. Let (n,p,p,k )[N3R be an observation of a number of firms (n . 1), a1
2
˜
˜ ˜ ˜price, profits and fixed costs, such that p /k , 1/n 1 2/n. There is an isoelastic demand
curve with unit elasticity and a cost function with constant marginal costs and a fixed
˜
˜ ˜ ˜costs k for which the SCEFE equilibrium with maximal number of firms is (n,p,p ).
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2 2
˜
˜ ˜ ˜Proof. As before take k5pn /(e 1 2en ). Solving this equation we obtain that
]]]2
˜ ˜ ˜pn p 1 22
˜ ˜ ]] ] ] ]e 5 2 n 1 n 1 (. 0). Thus e , 1⇔ , 1 .2
˜ ˜ n˜n˜œ k k
Similar calculations to the one performed in the proof of Theorem 5 show that the
required parameters are:
]]]2 2 2
˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜(n 1´) p n p(n2 1) pn2
˜ ˜]]]] ]]] ]]A5 , c5 , e 5 2 n 1 n 1 .2
˜ ˜n˜e 1 2e n œ k
˜ ˜Notice that because 0,e , 1,E fn 1e g5 n. Thus, the proposition is proved. h
Similar results can be obtained by assuming that the inverse demand is linear. In this
case a similar reasoning to the one used above shows that the bound on the rate of
profits is
˜2n 1 3 1 2
]]]] ] ], less than 1 ,2 2 n˜˜ ˜ ˜n 1 2n 1 1 n
but still substantial:
˜2n 1 3
˜ ]]]]If n5 20, . 9%,2
˜ ˜n 1 2n 1 1
not far for the 10% obtained in the isoelastic case.
Summing up, Theorems 5 and 6 make the point that SCEFE predicts very little about
the relationship between concentration and profitability.
5 . Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the properties of the Cournot model with free entry.
Two things are worth noticing:
1. Comparative statics may yield different answers from those obtained in the Cournot
model with a given number of firms. In particular, the shift of a parameter affecting
positively both payoffs and marginal payoffs may decrease aggregate output due to a
fall in the number of active firms.
2. The model studied here does not support the view that high profit rates can only be
sustained by preventing entry or by collusion of existing firms. Even if fixed costs are
observable, the model does not predict a straight relationship between number of
firms and profit rates.
Notice that the facts noticed in Points (1) and (2) cannot occur in perfectly
competitive markets. The fact that we have selected the SCEFE with maximal number of
firms, makes our results stronger because they occur in the allocation which is the
closest that we can get to the perfectly competitive allocation.
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We hope that future research will investigate if Points (1) and (2) above arise in other
models of imperfectly competitive markets with endogenous number of firms, e.g., in
models of product differentiation.
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